The references mentioned correspond to chapters I and II of the project.
SANTO DOMINGO. – This is the second report in the series on the bill that creates the Superintendency of Condominiums and serves as an analytical zoom of the first, which consisted of a global analysis that revealed that 88.8% of the articles of the bill present conflicts with twelve current institutions and laws.
A detailed examination of Chapters I and II shows how, from the very foundation of the proposal, regulatory and sanctioning powers are concentrated that duplicate municipal functions, encroach upon the competencies of the Real Estate and Consumer Protection Jurisdiction, and violate constitutional principles such as the legal reserve and the autonomy of condominium assemblies, confirming that the proposed superstructure would be born with serious structural flaws.
Context
The new backbone of urban growth, especially in Santo Domingo, Santiago, Punta Cana and other areas, is the development of vertical housing, which is no longer an emerging phenomenon, since more than 40% of new housing units in metropolitan areas are built under a condominium regime.
This trend strengthened after the pandemic, with the rise of short-term rentals, densification, and the expansion of mixed-use residential areas.
The expansion of vertical housing has generated new forms of coexistence, but also new conflicts and new administrative challenges.
In the midst of this scenario, Representative Tobias Crespo submitted the draft bill that creates the Superintendency of Condominiums of the Dominican Republic, a new, autonomous body attached to the Executive Branch, with broad regulatory powers over condominium life, from maintenance to conflicts and the oversight of construction companies.
An institution with very broad regulatory, sanctioning and oversight powers , even in matters that already have competent bodies.
Chapters I and II: Broad Power
The text, which ostensibly seeks to modernize coexistence in buildings, in its first chapter defines the legal nature of the Superintendency: an entity with its own assets and regulatory and sanctioning powers, functions that affect both the principle of legality and the institutional design of the State.
Chapter II details its internal bodies, headed by a superintendent with powers ranging from issuing binding resolutions to managing national registries and overseeing actors in the real estate sector. An official with almost ministerial powers.
At first glance, it sounds like institutional modernization. However, analysis reveals that many of the proposed already exist in current laws and are exercised by various state agencies.
In the seminar Active Citizenship: from reflection to action in vertical life, experts agreed that the problem is not solved with parallel bodies, but that vertical life needs clear rules, while respecting the country's institutional architecture.
And it is precisely this architecture that the project strongly addresses: Institutional overlap is at the heart of the project, as it grants the Superintendency the powers to:
- Issue mandatory regulations for all condominiums in the country
- To oversee construction companies, developers, and administrators
- Impose administrative sanctions
- Maintain parallel national records
- Intervening in neighborhood conflicts
- Regulating occupation, use, and even cohabitation
But these are functions already performed by organs such as:
- MIVHED (technical construction standards, licenses, quality control)
- Local councils (coexistence, noise, land use permits)
- Real Estate Jurisdiction (registries, titles, condominium units)
- Consumer Protection (relationship between purchasers and developers)
- DGII (tax obligations of condominiums and income)
- Ministry of Tourism (short rentals and lodging)
- CODIA (technical qualification of professionals).
Israel López a lawyer specializing in real estate law who has promoted the reform of Law 5038-58, the risk is evident: “If the country creates a body to regulate what is already regulated, what will come is bureaucracy, conflicts between institutions and unnecessary litigation.”
Can it regulate beyond the law?
Another critical point is the constitutional one: the proposal grants the superintendent the power to issue regulations that limit the use of private property. The proponents forgot that the Constitutional Court has repeatedly stated that any essential limitation on the right to property must be established by law , not by administrative regulations.
In other words, the Superintendency would have a regulatory power that exceeds what is permitted by the Constitution.
The director of Global Municipality, Víctor Féliz , stated at the aforementioned seminar: “If we want clear rules for vertical living, they must arise from a well-designed legal reform, not from administrative resolutions that seek to replace the role of the legislator.”
An administrative body cannot assume functions that, by law, belong to ministries, municipalities, or the judiciary. Such overlaps generate litigation and disorder.
What would this mean for citizens?
If the draft bill is approved without modifications, residents and administrators could face more permits, more inspections, more penalties, and more registrations, duplicating current and potential conflicts between institutions. In short, more bureaucracy, with no guarantee of improved coexistence.
Overlaps and normative conflicts detected in Chapters I and II
| Proposed function | Institution with current legal competence | Level of conflict | Nature of the conflict | Consequence for the citizen |
| Issuance of technical standards for condominiums | MIVED / Municipalities / Consumer Protection | High | Legal and constitutional | Double regulation; confusion of rules |
| Supervision of builders and developers | MIVHED / CODIA / Pro Consumer | High | Legal and operational | More permits; project delays |
| Creation of parallel condominium records | Real Estate Jurisdiction (Law 108-05) | High | Legal and administrative | Document duplication; legal uncertainty |
| Administrative sanctions for coexistence | City Councils / Municipal Police | Half | Legal | Confusion of jurisdictions; contradictory fines |
| Mediation and conflict resolution | Judicial Branch / Private Arbitration | Half | Constitutional | Risk of usurpation of jurisdictional functions |
| Rules on the use of private areas | National Congress (legal reserve) | High | Constitutional | Unconstitutional limitation of the right to property |
This means that, from its inception, the project proposes a state superstructure that interferes with, duplicates, or contradicts lines of competence already defined by law , which could generate legal uncertainty, bureaucracy, and administrative conflicts if the piece is approved without a thorough technical review.
“An administrative entity cannot assume functions that by law belong to ministries, municipalities, or the Judiciary. This type of overlap generates litigation and disorder,” says lawyer Israel López.
The accumulation of powers also poses a constitutional risk: the Constitutional Court has reiterated that the regulation of property rights requires a legal reservation , not regulations issued by an administrative body.
This means that a Superintendency with the power to dictate rules on the use, limitations and obligations of condominium owners could end up encroaching on legislative powers , which exposes the law to questions of unconstitutionality.
If approved as presented in the Chamber of Deputies, this bill would subject citizens, administrators, and developers to double or triple regulation on the same issue: new permits, fees, and certifications; sanctions issued by multiple authorities; duplicate registrations causing legal confusion; and interference between institutions, generating delays, bureaucracy, and a greater administrative burden without any guarantee of improved coexistence.
In urban terms, this would slow down building management, increase costs, and foster institutional conflict.
By analyzing the first two chapters through the lens of a Comparative Chart of Overlaps and Normative Conflicts, 6 articles with shortcomings are identified that directly clash with 8 current institutions and laws, including: MIVED, Municipalities, Pro Consumer, Real Estate Jurisdiction, DGII, Ministry of Tourism, CODIA, Law 108-05, Law 176-07 and the Constitution.
List of conflicting articles and type of overlap with laws and institutions:
| Article | Subject | Affected Institutions / Laws | Type of overlap | Level of conflict |
| 2 | Regulate, supervise and support the management of condominiums | Law 5038-58 on Condominiums (autonomy of assemblies), Law 176-07 on Municipalities (municipal powers) | Duplication of municipal functions in coexistence and local order; risk of interference with the autonomy of condominium assemblies | High |
| 5 | Regulatory authority (binding resolutions), administrative sanctions, institutional management | Constitution (principle of legality), Condominium Law 5038-58, Municipal Law 176-07, Consumer Protection Law 358-05 | Excessive regulations that may encroach upon municipal and assembly powers; duplication of sanctions with city councils and consumer protection agencies | High |
| 6 | Technical supervision of condominiums, maintenance, common areas, state-owned condominiums and rental properties | MIVHED (technical competencies), Municipalities Law 176-07, Real Estate Jurisdiction Law 108-05 | Technical duplication with MIVHED and municipalities; risk of encroachment on the registration powers of the Real Estate Jurisdiction | Half |
| 7 | Advisory Council: an advisory body with representatives from MIVHED, the Municipal League, CODIA, condominium associations, and real estate agents | MIVHED, Dominican Municipal League, CODIA | Slight consultative overlap: creates a parallel advisory forum that duplicates existing spaces in those institutions | Low |
| 8 | Providing opinions on regulations, advising on budgets, evaluating training policies, and serving as a liaison | Ministry of Finance and Congress (budget cycle), Municipalities – Law 176-07 and MIVHED | Budgetary ambiguity; minor overlap with local councils and MIVHED in community training | Half |
| 9 | Internal organization, supervision and sanction procedures, citizen participation mechanisms | Constitution (legal reserve), Condominium Law 5038-58, Municipal Law 176-07 | Regulatory excess; interference with internal condominium regulations; duplication with municipal powers | High |
Experts agree that this project needs a thorough constitutional review, a clear delimitation of powers, an institutional design compatible with the current legal framework, and a realistic approach to coexistence in vertical living, in order to move forward.
Otherwise, it risks becoming a duplicated superstructure that increases bureaucracy without solving the problems of coexistence.


